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Abstract 
As the first cases before the ICC proceed to the Appeals Chamber, the judges ought to critically 
evaluate the merits and demerits of the control-theory of perpetratorship and its related doctrines. 
The request for a possible re-characterization of the form of responsibility in the case of Katanga 
and the recent acquittal of Ngudjolo can be taken as indications that the control-theory, is 
problematic as a theory of liability. The authors, in a spirit of constructive criticism, invite the 
ICC Appeals Chamber to take this unique opportunity to reconsider or improve the control-theory 
as developed by the Pre-Trial Chambers in the Lubanga and Katanga cases. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of 14 March 2012 marked an important moment in the 
ICC’s history. 1 It was the first judgment by an ICC Trial Chamber. Lubanga was found guilty of 
having committed the war crime of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers and sentenced to 14 
years imprisonment.2  
 On 18 December 2012, the ICC issued its second judgment, this time an acquittal. 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted of charges for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed during an attack on Bogoro village in the DRC.3  Both, the Lubanga conviction and                                                         
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1 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment, Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012 
hereinafter Lubanga judgment). 
2 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 July 2012. 
3 Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Jugement rendu en application de l'article 74 du Statut, Trial 
Chamber II, ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 December 2012 (hereinafter Ngudjolo judgment/acquittal). 
the Ngudjolo acquittal came with vigorous dissents with regard to the ‘control’ theory of liability 
for perpetration.4 This theory, developed by the Pre-Trial Chambers in Lubanga and Katanga and 
Ngudjolo centers upon the concept of ‘control’ as marking a distinction between principal 
liability and accessorial liability and is based on the assertion that Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute 
provides for a hierarchical structure of the modes of participation. According to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Lubanga, this hierarchical structure implies that co-perpetration, as principal 
liability, requires proof of an essential contribution to the common plan that resulted in the 
commission of the crime.5   
The control-theory has its source in the writings of criminal law scholar Claus Roxin, who 
attempted to devise a theory for holding Nazi leaders such as Adolf Eichmann responsible as 
perpetrators of the atrocities committed under their regime.6 At the ICC and beyond, the control-
theory has remained controversial. The control-theory can, however, be credited for promoting 
fair labelling.7 But Judge Fulford, in his separate opinion in Lubanga, opines that the control-
theory is (i) unsupported by the text of the Statute, (ii) which does not create a hierarchy of 
liability and (iii) that joint perpetration does not require an essential contribution of each co-
perpetrator. The latter requirement, in his view, would set too high a threshold for liability. He 
argues in favour of a plain text reading of Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute and, with regard to 
joint perpetration, proposes that a contribution to the crime is ‘[d]irect or indirect, provided either 
way there is a causal link between the individual’s contribution and the crime’.8  
 Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her opinion in the Ngudjolo decision of acquittal, agrees with 
Fulford that the control-theory is not consistent with the ordinary meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of 
the ICC Statute and that Article 25(3) does not create a hierarchy of blameworthiness. With 
regard to the requirement of an essential contribution, she is of the view that: 
                                                        
4 Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford to Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment, Trial 
Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge 
Fulford); Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert to Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Jugement rendu en application de l'article 74 du Statut, Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 
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7 See D. Guilfoyle, ‘Responsibility for Collective Atrocities: Fair labelling and Approaches to Commission in 
International Criminal Law, (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 1, at 6. See E. van Sliedregt, ‘The curious 
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8 Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para. 16. 
[f]or joint perpetration, there must, in my view, be a direct contribution to the realisation 
of the material elements of the crime. This follows from the very concept of joint 
perpetration. Under Article 25(3)(a), only persons who have committed a crime together 
can be held responsible. The essence of committing a crime is bringing about its material 
elements.9 
 
Van den Wyngaert is further critical of the combination of joint perpetration and indirect 
perpetration into ‘indirect co-perpetration’. This combined form of liability has been developed 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga and Ngudjolo with the purpose of capturing complex forms 
of collective violence. To Van den Wyngaert’s mind, this theory, which presupposes an 
organized structure of power that uses (‘controls’) individuals as tools to commit crimes, 
conflicts with the text of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute and Article 22 of the ICC Statute. 
   Contrary to the approach favoured by Judges Fulford and van den Wyngaert, judicial 
practice at the ICC, at least so far, has demonstrated a penchant for judicial activism and 
creativity. This stands in contrast to the textual approach one would expect, given the fact the 
ICC Statute contains elaborate statutory definitions, a general part, and extensive Elements of 
Crimes. Article 21 of the Statute primarily refers the judges to these sources rather than to general 
rules that may be found in domestic laws.  
 In this paper, we will not discuss the question whether there exists a sufficient legal basis 
for the control-theory; this has been done elsewhere.10 We instead wish to appraise the substance 
of control-theory. We will focus primarily on two of its manifestations: joint perpetration and 
indirect co-perpetration. Thirdly, we discuss the alleged hierarchy in Article 25(3) of the ICC 
Statute, on which some aspects of control-theory have been based.  
 
2. JOINT PERPETRATION AND THE ‘ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION’  
 
2.1. Control-theory and joint perpetration 
With respect to joint perpetration, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga defined ‘control’ as ‘joint 
control over the crime by reason of the essential nature of the various contributions to the                                                         
9 Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 44. 
10 S. Manacorda and C. Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise: Concurring 
Approaches in the Practice of International Criminal Law?’, (2011) 9 JICJ 159–78. See also T. Weigend, 
‘Perpetration Through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German Legal Concept’, (2011) 9 JICJ 
91–111. E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (2012), 83–88. 
commission of the crime’.11 The Chamber recognized that in cases of joint perpetration none of 
the perpetrators normally ‘controls’ the commission of the offence by himself, because the 
defining feature of co-perpetration is a division of labour.12  But ‘when the objective elements of 
an offence are carried out by a plurality of persons acting within the framework of a common 
plan, only those to whom essential tasks have been assigned—and who, consequently, have the 
power to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing their tasks—can be said to 
have joint control over the crime.’13 
 The defining feature of joint perpetration, according to the Chamber’s definition, is a 
hypothetical power, namely ‘the power to frustrate the commission of the crime by not 
performing their tasks’.14 Because this decisive criterion is framed in negative terms (‘frustrating’ 
by ‘not performing’), there exists no particular affirmative act that a person must perform in order 
to become a joint perpetrator. The Lubanga Trial Chamber indeed emphasized that a person can 
be a co-perpetrator even where he does not physically perpetrate any of the elements of the crime 
in question and where he is not even present at the scene of the crime.15 It can be sufficient, for 
example, for the actor to be a ‘mastermind’ who decides ‘whether and how the offence will be 
committed’.16 
 The effect of the control-theory, as devised by the Lubanga Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers, 
is ambivalent. The theory limits the concept of (joint) perpetration to those participants in a 
criminal enterprise whose contribution is a condition without which the criminal plan could not 
have come to fruition. But the control-theory, on the other hand, expands the scope of 
perpetratorship to persons who are far removed from the scene of the crime and do not personally 
perform any of the acts required by the offence definition. 
 
2.2. Criticism of Judge Fulford 
                                                        
11  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 341 (emphasis added) (hereinafter Lubanga Conformation 
Decision). See Lubanga Judgment, para. 1000. 
12 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, para. 342. The Chamber concluded: ‘Hence, although none of the 
participants has overall control over the offence because they all depend on one another for its 
commission, they all share control because each of them could frustrate the commission of the crime by 
not carrying out his or her task.’ 
13 Ibid., para. 347. 
14 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC-01/04-
01/07, 30 September 2008, para. 525 (hereinafter Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision) 
15 Lubanga Judgment, para. 1004. 
16 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, para. 330; Lubanga Judgment, para. 1003. 
Judge Fulford, in his separate opinion in Lubanga, agrees with the expansive element of the 
definition given by the majority of the Trial Chamber. But he regards that definition as too 
narrow where it demands an ‘essential’, indispensable contribution. Judge Fulford proposes 
instead a very simple test for joint perpetration, namely whether there exists ‘an operative link 
between the individual’s contribution and the commission of the crime’.17 By applying this test, a 
court would be able to avoid ‘a hypothetical investigation as to how events might have unfolded 
without the accused’s involvement’.18 Yet, Judge Fulford seems to equate the required ‘operative 
link’ with causation, because in the following paragraph of his opinion he demands for co-
perpetration that there exist ‘a causal link between the individual’s contribution and the crime’.19 
That phrase raises the question what exactly Judge Fulford understands by a ‘causal link’. If an 
act (say, the furnishing of a weapon to a murderer) is ‘operative’ in the commission of the 
offence (because the murderer uses that weapon), does that create a causal link between the 
furnishing of the weapon and the killing? If so, how would Judge Fulford distinguish between a 
(joint) perpetrator and a mere aider and abettor? Can there be different (stronger or weaker) types 
of ‘causal links’? Can there be a ‘causal link’ that is not essential? Does causation not necessarily 
imply that without the existence of the factor in question the consequence would not have 
occurred? And if not, why would a marginal, easily replaceable contribution be sufficient to turn 
a mere helper into a co-perpetrator? How about a man who provides not the weapon used in the 
offence but a bicycle which the killer rides to the site of the crime? Would furnishing the bicycle 
also have an ‘operative’ or ‘causal’ link to the killing? Would the answer to that question depend 
on whether the bicycle was, under the circumstances, the only means by which the killer could 
arrive at the relevant site in time to kill the victim? If so, does Judge Fulford’s analysis not also 
have to take into account whether the means provided was ‘essential’?20  
 There may well be convincing answers to all these questions, but Judge Fulford 
unfortunately does not provide them. The test of perpetratorship which he suggests therefore 
remains vague and leaves the judges very much to their intuition rather than providing them with 
standards by which to make the difficult distinction between perpetration and mere accessorial 
liability. Judge Fulford is correct, of course, in pointing out that many legal systems, including 
the Statute of the ICC, do not provide for different sentencing levels for perpetrators and                                                         
17 Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para. 15. 
18 Ibid., para. 17. 
19 Ibid., para. 16. 
20 Probably Judge Fulford’s ‘operative link’ would, upon closer inspection, end up looking very much like 
the Lubanga majority’s ‘essential contribution’. 
accessories. Yet, as long as the law distinguishes between several forms of involvement in a 
criminal offence—and the ICC Statute in Art. 25 (3) clearly makes such a distinction21—those 
who apply the law may not use the various labels arbitrarily. A judge cannot on Monday convict 
a defendant of aiding and abetting, and on Tuesday convict another defendant of joint 
perpetration on the same or very similar facts, telling the Tuesday defendant that it makes no 
difference, in the result, whether he is convicted of perpetration or of aiding and abetting.22 
 
2.3. Criticism of Judge van den Wyngaert 
Judge van den Wyngaert, in her concurring opinion in Ngudjolo, takes issue with both effects of 
the control theory; in her opinion, that theory is at the same time too broad and too narrow. She 
suggests that joint perpetration does not require an ‘essential’ causal contribution23 but ‘a direct 
contribution to the realisation of the material elements of the crime.’24 Like Judge Fulford, Judge 
van den Wyngaert rejects the ‘essentiality’ requirement because it compels judges ‘to engage in 
artificial, speculative exercises about whether a crime would still have been committed if one of 
the accused had not made exactly the same contribution.’25 But she also finds insufficient Judge 
Fulford’s broad stroke approach under which anyone who provides some ‘causal’ element can be 
treated as a perpetrator. Instead, Judge van den Wyngaert would limit perpetratorship to those 
who directly bring about the material elements of an offence.26 She concedes that the notion of 
‘direct’ perpetration is not easy to apply to some of the more complex offences typical of 
international law, such as displacing a civilian population in violation of Article 8(2)(e)(viii) of 
the ICC Statute. In these cases—which may well be the majority of cases coming before the                                                         
21 Judge Fulford claims that the concepts which appear in the four subsections of Art. 5(3) of the ICC 
Statute ‘will often be indistinguishable in their application vis-à-vis a particular situation, and by creating 
a clear degree of crossover between the various modes of liability, Article 25(3) covers all eventualities’. 
Therefore, he thinks, ‘the possible modes of commission under Article 25(3)(a) – (d) of the Statute were 
not intended to be mutually exclusive.’ (Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para. 7). It is not 
quite clear on what evidence Judge Fulford makes this claim. But even if the authors of the ICC Statute 
had foreseen that, in a given situation, more than one mode of liability under Sec. 25 (3) might be 
applicable, that would not justify leaving these various modes undefined and adjudicating cases using a 
vague ‘crossover’ form of criminal liability. 
22 The dispute on whether Art. 25 (3) (a)–(d) of the ICC Statute contains a hierarchical ranking of various 
forms of liability (Lubanga judgment, paras. 994–999, See also G. Werle, ‘Individual criminal 
responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’, (2007) 5 JICJ 953, 957, or a mere listing (Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion Judge Fulford, para. 9; Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert paras. 22–30) is not of 
much relevance to the question whether it is necessary to properly define these forms of liability. 
23 Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, paras. 41–42. 
24 Ibid., para. 44 (emphasis in the original). 
25 Ibid., para. 42. 
26 Ibid., para. 44. 
ICC—she would regard as ‘direct’ perpetrators even those who plan or organize the acts in 
question, because planning is ‘an intrinsic part of the actual execution of the crime.’27 
 One may regard this ‘softening’ of Judge van den Wyngaert’s approach as a sign of  
welcome flexibility. But the adaptations proposed by Judge van den Wyngaert also indicate that 
the criterion of ‘directness’ has only a modest measure of distinctive substance. If ‘direct’ 
causation can also mean participation in the planning stage long before the actual displacement of 
civilians takes place (to use Judge van den Wyngaert’s example), what then is the difference 
between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ or ‘remote’ causation? Judge van den Wyngaert claims that what 
is ‘direct’ will have to be determined by the facts of each case.28 But if it is the judges who in 
each individual case need to determine what is ‘direct’ and what is not—why not simply leave 
the question of who is a perpetrator to the appreciation of the court, as Judge Fulford suggests? 
 The ‘directness’ criterion also lacks a convincing normative basis. Judge van den 
Wyngaert’s main argument in favour of this criterion is that it treats individual and joint 
perpetrators equally: since a person acting alone can be convicted only if he ‘brings about’ the 
material elements of the offence (e.g., by shooting the victim), she claims, the same should apply 
if two or more persons act jointly.29 But joint perpetration differs in one critical aspect from 
perpetration by an individual offender: the job of committing the offence is divided up among the 
co-actors; they join forces for the very purpose of relieving each participant of the necessity to 
‘bring about’ by himself the result of the criminal plan. If it were a necessary requirement for 
every joint perpetrator to individually fulfil each element of the offence definition, the concept of 
joint perpetration would be superfluous—every participant could be convicted as an individual 
perpetrator. Judge van den Wyngaert’s equation of individual and joint perpetration thus misses 
the very point of joint perpetration: the division of labour among the co-perpetrators. 
 
2.4. What makes joint perpetration? 
What, then, is the distinctive feature of joint perpetration? Before we proceed to suggest an 
answer to this question let us consider why it is necessary to do so. As we said above, whenever 
the law differentiates between perpetrators and accessories there have to be criteria for drawing 
the line between these categories, lest the courts apply them on a mere hunch or on arbitrary 
grounds. A need to define joint perpetration and to keep it apart from other types of criminal                                                         
27 Ibid., para. 47. 
28 Ibid., para.  46. 
29Ibid., para. 45. 
liability therefore exists in all legal systems that, like the ICC Statute, distinguish between 
perpetrators and accessories.  
 As we have seen, single-word ‘theories’ (relying on expressions like ‘direct’ or ‘operative 
link’ to solve the problem) hardly satisfy the need to inform and shape the application of the law 
in this area, because they do not offer more than a very general idea about what may be the gist of 
joint perpetration. The control theory as devised by the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber has the great 
advantage of offering a binary criterion: either one’s contribution to the completion of the crime 
is essential, i.e., a conditio sine qua non—or it is not. And the ‘essentiality’ criterion is also prima 
vista plausible: it reflects the value judgment that those who provide central contributions are, in 
general, more blameworthy than those who remain at the margins of the criminal enterprise and 
provide only support that the main actors could have done without. 
 Yet, even the control-theory may lack sufficient sophistication. One of its problems is the 
question from what perspective the ‘essential’ character of a given act is to be determined. This 
can be done from an ex ante and an ex post perspective, that is, looking forward from the stage of 
planning the crime,30 or looking backward after its completion (or frustration). The analysis of 
the ‘essentiality’ of any participant’s contribution is easier and more reliable if one gauges it ex 
ante, for example at the planning stage of the crime. Looking at the plans of the persons involved, 
it is not difficult to determine whose contribution they deem indispensable and which 
contributions they regard as ‘accessorial’, that is, useful but not crucial to the success of the plan. 
Taking an ex ante view has the disadvantage, however, that the judge must accept as binding any 
miscalculation on the part of the conspirators: if A and B think that a robbery can succeed only if 
B provides a gun, that expectation would, under an ex ante ‘essentiality’ test, turn B into a joint 
perpetrator if he actually furnishes the gun; and that would hold true even if A does not use the 
gun in the robbery but obtains the money by mere verbal threats. Using an ex post perspective 
(‘Was B’s contribution ‘essential’ to the robbery as it was actually carried out?’) avoids this 
difficulty but leads to the problem of hypothetical guessing, which Judges Fulford and van den                                                         
30 The Trial Chamber in Lubanga seems to take an ex ante perspective where it refers to the assignment of 
roles as the test for what is ‘essential’ (Lubanga Judgment, para. 1000); but it is not entirely clear whether 
the Chamber would rule out a re-assessment of the distribution of roles after the fact. The prosecution in 
Lubanga proposed to distinguish between an assessment ex ante (where the co-perpetrator must have 
been assigned a contribution that was ‘central to the implementation’ of the common plan) and a 
retrospective assessment of the plan as it was carried out (where it should be sufficient that the co-
perpetrator’s contribution can be deemed ‘substantial’); cf. Lubanga Judgment, paras. 990–991. The Trial 
Chamber did not adopt or even discuss that distinction, thus leaving unresolved the question whether the 
requirements of joint perpetration should be assessed from the participants’ perspective ex ante or from 
an objective perspective ex post.   
Wyngaert raised in their opinions. If A, in the robbery hypothetical, actually uses B’s gun in 
order to threaten the victim, we cannot say with any degree of certainty what the outcome would 
have been if B had not provided the gun. Perhaps A would have desisted from the robbery 
altogether, or perhaps he might have hidden a banana or some other object in his pocket and 
pretended that it was a gun, thus threatening the victim sufficiently to make him hand over the 
money. In conclusion, then, while both perspectives may lead to different results in any given 
case, neither is without flaws. 
 But that is not even the main problem with the ‘essentiality’ test. Contrary to what Judge 
Fulford has written, 31 the Lubanga court’s control-theory may not define perpetratorship too 
narrowly but too broadly. The way the Trial Chamber applies the test to the facts of Lubanga 
gives an indication of how far the net of perpetration is cast under the seemingly narrow 
‘essentiality’ test. A joint perpetrator, the Lubanga majority holds, does not have to be present at 
the scene of the crime, and there need not even exist a direct or physical link between his 
contribution and the commission of the crime; it is sufficient for a perpetrator to assist in 
formulating the relevant strategy or plan, to become involved in directing or controlling other 
participants or to determine the roles of those involved in the offence.32 If all these contributions, 
which can be quite remote in time and place from the commission of the offence, are deemed 
‘essential’ and thus sufficient to establish perpetratorship, then one must ask what remains for 
mere accessorial liability as an instigator or an aider and abettor. If, for example, a scientist in 
2012 provides critical information which enables the leadership of a state to produce chemical 
weapons prohibited under Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) ICC Statute, is he then—assuming he has 
foreseen the use of the weapons—a joint perpetrator of an attack carried out with these weapons 
in 2014? 
 If we wish to distinguish between those who are at the centre of the criminal offence and 
therefore deserve to be labelled as perpetrators, and those who remain at the margins in a 
supporting role and should therefore be punished as accessories, then the one-dimensional 
criterion of the indispensability of the contribution may be insufficient because it captures only 
one aspect that may be relevant. We might indeed have to give up the (attractive) idea of basing 
the distinction on a single factor and look instead for a cluster of factors that will have to be taken 
into consideration. In doing so, we should be aware that the line between (joint) perpetrators and                                                         
31 Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para 16. 
32 Lubanga Judgment, paras. 1003–1004. 
accessories cannot be drawn on empirical grounds but requires a normative (value) judgment—a 
judgment that in the last resort is based on a notion of fair attribution and is therefore soft at the 
edges. The factors relevant for this value judgment cannot simply be deduced from the facts of 
each individual case, because facts by themselves give us no clue as to their normative valuation. 
What we can do, however, is try to identify factors which indicate a ‘central’ role in a criminal 
enterprise, and thus perpetratorship. Even when we have agreed on such factors, there is still 
plenty of room for judicial weighing and balancing in each case, because these factors may, on a 
given set of facts, pull into opposite directions. But at least we would have criteria by which to 
rationally evaluate any borderline case.  
 One approach in defining such criteria centers on mens rea. It has often been emphasized 
that participation in or at least adherence to a common plan is one factor that must exist in any 
case of joint perpetration. A person who does not cooperate with others on the basis of some— 
albeit silent—agreement may be liable as an individual perpetrator but cannot be a ‘joint’ 
perpetrator. What other mens rea requirements may be necessary for perpetratorship depends on 
each offence definition. 33  One should note, however, that a common plan, as that term is 
traditionally understood by international courts, often exists also between perpetrators and 
accessories: an instigator consciously works together with the perpetrator in the initial stage, and 
aiders and abettors also often support the commission of the offence based on an agreement with 
the main perpetrators. The existence of such a minimal agreement therefore is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition of joint perpetration. One of the authors of this article has recently 
developed the idea that a joint intention that the group commit a collective crime is the defining 
element of co-perpetration; what is required, under this approach, is joint deliberation and the 
meshing of sub-plans among co-perpetrators. 34 Another subjective factor of possible relevance is 
a strong personal interest in the success of the criminal enterprise, going beyond the minimal 
requirement of mens rea. Such a personal interest may be regarded as a (weak) indicator of joint 
perpetration, because a person interested in the outcome will, ceteris paribus, contribute more 
eagerly and persistently than a person who acts out of altruism or for a set fee.35                                                          
33 It is not logically impossible for several persons to co-perpetrate a crime of recklessness or dolus 
eventualis; but inadvertent negligence and joint perpetration in a technical sense seem to be mutually 
exclusive. 
34 See J. D. Ohlin, ‘Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes’, (2011) 11 Chicago JIL 693, at 721.  
35  German courts have traditionally relied heavily on subjective factors for distinguishing between 
perpetrators and accessories, treating as mere accessories those who participated in the crime with an 
animus socii (mind of an associate); See Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Judgment of 23 
January 1958, 11 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 268 at 271–2; 
 An alternative approach places greater emphasis on objective factors. If one follows that 
approach, the indispensable nature of a person’s contribution weighs heavily as an indicator of 
perpetratorship, and might even be regarded as a necessary requirement for a finding of 
perpetratorship. A person whose contribution has no critical bearing on the implementation of the 
criminal plan hardly qualifies as a ‘central’ or ‘essential’ participant. But as we have tried to 
show above, the indispensability of a contribution is not under all circumstances a sufficient 
condition for attributing perpetratorship. One option is to add an element of immediacy, of 
carrying out a task temporally close to the commission of the material elements of the offence. 
Roxin, whose writings have to some extent influenced the international debate on this subject,36 
has suggested that only those who participate in the crime after the stage of attempt has been 
reached should be considered co-perpetrators.37 This limitation goes in the right direction but 
may be a bit too ‘technical’ since it would make joint perpetration depend on the vagaries of the 
definition of attempt. But under an objective approach, an element of ‘control’ over the actual 
commission of the offence is an important indicator of joint perpetration. Typically, a joint 
perpetrator (co-)decides whether and how the offence is actually perpetrated, either by directly 
taking part in the actus reus or at least by overseeing—by telephone, for example—the 
commission of the crime by the immediate actors.38  
 In sum, the concept of ‘control’ in the control-theory as propounded by the Lubanga 
majority may be too one-dimensional. What we should be looking for is a more comprehensive                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 10 March 1961, 16 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in 
Strafsachen 12 at 14; for a summary of the present position of the Federal Court of Justice see 
Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 24 October 2002, 48  Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in 
Strafsachen 52 at 56. Of course, in most cases it is the judges who determine, in hindsight and on 
considerations of equity, what may have been the ‘mind’ of a participant at the time of the crime. The 
emphasis on subjective elements thus leaves the distinction between perpetrators and accessories to the 
practically unreviewable discretion of the trial court. 
36 It is not necessary here to discuss at length Professor Roxin’s many contributions to the German debate 
on perpetratorship. But it should be noted that Roxin has expressly rejected the ‘essentiality’ theory as 
defined by the Lubanga majority:  Roxin—followed by the great majority of German writers—requires for 
co-perpetratorship a ‘substantial’ contribution to the common plan as regarded ex ante, but writes that the 
contribution of a co-perpetrator need not be ‘causal’ for the offence as a whole (See Roxin 2003, supra 
note 6, at § 25 marginal note 213). For an overview of the current German debate on the subject, see B. 
Weißer, Täterschaft in Europa (2011), 333–337. 
37 See Roxin 2003, supra note 6, at § 25 marginal note 199. 
38 Under that test, a gang leader might be a joint perpetrator of a bank robbery where he is in contact, by 
mobile phone, with the actors in the bank, and can decide, for example, that the robbery attempt should be 
abandoned when the perpetrators report unexpected obstacles. If that is not the case, the leader of a 
criminal group would come under the label of ‘ordering, soliciting or inducing’ (Art. 25 (3)(b) ICC Statute), 
or he might be considered a perpetrator ‘through another person’ if the special requirements of 
domination of others are fulfilled. For extensive argument on these points, see Roxin 2003, supra note 6, 
at § 25 marginal notes 198 et seq.; B. Schünemann, § 25 marginal notes 180 et seq., in: H. W. Laufhütte, R. 
Rissing-van Saan and K. Tiedemann (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch. Leipziger Kommentar, vol. I (2007). 
model of joint perpetratorship which contains both subjective and objective elements. Typical 
factors are a person’s involvement in the planning of a joint enterprise, his mens rea, and possibly 
his personal interest in the success of the enterprise; furthermore, the importance of his 
contribution to the success of the criminal plan and the proximity of his contribution to the actual 
commission of the offence. It is a matter of debate whether greater emphasis should be placed on 
subjective or on objective factors. But only if we recognize that there is a cluster of different 
considerations that may be relevant can we rationally lead that debate. 
 
3. INDIRECT CO-PERPETRATION 
Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her concurring opinion in the Ngudjolo acquittal, analyses the mode 
of liability known as indirect co-perpetration and concludes that the theory is not included in 
Article 25(a) of the ICC Statute.39 
The issue is of the highest importance, since many of the recent indictments at the ICC, 
including al-Bashir and the Kenya cases, have accused the defendants of perpetrating their 
crimes as indirect co-perpetrators.40 Indeed, one can easily understand why the doctrine is so 
powerful. Since the ICC concentrates on the highest-level perpetrators far removed from the 
scene of the crime (and the actus reus), the Office of the Prosecutor must assert a linking 
principle that connects the defendants to the physical commission of the crime by street-level 
perpetrators.  
The building blocks of the doctrine stem from combining other modes of liability already 
introduced into the ICC jurisprudence through German criminal law theory. In Lubanga, an ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber defined co-perpetrators as perpetrators exercising joint control over the 
crime.41 In addition, Roxin had developed the notion that a person can be guilty of indirect 
perpetration where he controls the direct perpetrators—who may themselves be criminally 
responsible—by means of a hierarchically organized structure. He labelled this as 
                                                        
39 Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 59. 
40  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on 
Conﬁrmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012 (hereinafter Muthaura 
et al. Confirmation Decision); Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges, ICC Appeals Chamber, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 (hereinafter Ruto et al. 
Confirmation Decision); Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-
02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009. 
41 Lubanga,  Confirmation Decision, para. 340. 
Organisationsherrschaft, or perpetration through an organized apparatus of power. 42   By 
combining these two modes of liability, the Office of the Prosecutor and the ICC developed the 
doctrine of indirect co-perpetration—what can only be described as a truly potent prosecutorial 
tool; it allows the conviction of defendants who are substantially removed from the physical 
perpetrator of the crime along two axes. 43 
One can imagine the wide applicability of this theory; it is certainly not limited to the 
Katanga and Ngudjolo case. Indeed, it may very well represent the future of international 
criminal prosecutions before the ICC, just as Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) came to define the 
prosecutorial strategy regarding perpetration at the ICTY. In most cases involving governmental 
or similarly organized atrocities, multiple higher-level government or rebel officials will 
collaborate to perpetrate the criminal conduct. Moreover, none of these officials will commit the 
crimes directly by themselves; rather, one or more of them will utilize vertical bureaucracies 
under their authority. The result is a deadly efficient division of labour. Or so proponents of the 
doctrine would argue, thereby equating the culpability of all leaders at the horizontal level as full 
perpetrators. Indeed, this was the original theory in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case. Both 
Katanga and Ngudjolo allegedly utilized rebel organizations at their disposal and only by 
combining their forces could they perpetrate the atrocities. Therefore, according to the OTP, each 
defendant was not only responsible for the actions of their own troops but also responsible for the 
actions of the other’s troops.44 This cross-liability represented the full force of the indirect co-
perpetration doctrine. Leaders become responsible not just for individuals under their command, 
but also for individuals that their collaborators command. 
 
3.1. Can Modes of Liability be Combined at Will? 
In our view, Van den Wyngaert was right to express caution about this mode of liability. First and 
most importantly, Van den Wyngaert argued that there was nothing in the text of Article 25 to 
                                                        
42 See Roxin 2011, supra note 6, 193–207. 
43 Not only are such defendants vertically removed from the commission of the crime (by virtue of their 
indirect perpetration), but they are horizontally removed as well (by virtue of their co-perpetration with 
other collaborators on the horizontal level).  The notion of ‘control’ then provides the connection that links 
such defendants, along the two axes, to the physical perpetrators of the atrocities. See J. D. Ohlin, ‘Second-
Order Linking Principles: Combining Vertical and Horizontal Modes of Liability’, (2012) 25 LJIL 771. 
Indirect co-perpetration therefore has some structural similarities with later versions of JCE theory, 
because under the latter doctrine the leadership-level JCE need not encompass the relevant physical 
perpetrators, who might report directly to one member of the JCE. 
44 Katanga and Ngudjolo Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 484. 
justify such ad hockery. 45  Article 25(3)(a) talks of perpetrating ‘jointly with another’ and 
‘through another person’, but does not mention the possibility of combining these modes of 
liability.46 Can separate modes of liability be combined without special justification?47 There are 
normative reasons to be sceptical of such combinations and it must be determined whether they 
are consistent with international criminal law in general and the ICC Statute in particular. In the 
case of indirect co-perpetration, one might argue that the defendants in such cases will 
independently satisfy the criteria for each mode of liability. Consequently, the demands of both 
co-perpetration and indirect perpetration are independently satisfied.  So what could be the harm 
in that? 
Indirect co-perpetration involves something more than a straightforward application of 
the concepts of indirect and co-perpetration as those terms are used in Article 25 of the ICC 
Statute. The Katanga and Ngudjolo Pre-Trial Chamber decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
concluded that only with the cooperation of both forces were the defendants able to consummate 
the international crimes.48  But it was not the case that each of the defendants met the standards 
for both cooperation and indirect perpetration. Indeed, if that had been the case, the doctrine of 
indirect co-perpetration would have been superfluous; prosecutors could simply have selected 
between co-perpetration and indirect perpetration and could have proceeded with one of these 
doctrines as their theory of the case. For example, in the ICTY Stakić case, one of the first to 
attempt application of the control-theory, the Trial Chamber held that Stakić was responsible as a 
principal to the crime even though it was subordinates of his co-perpetrator who performed the 
actual killings.49 It was therefore not the case that Stakić independently met the standards for 
indirect perpetration, since he was not personally in control of the vertical organization that 
performed the killings. The question is whether such doctrinal overreach is a natural outgrowth of 
the judicial application of the doctrine of indirect co-perpetration or whether it is implicit in the 
doctrine itself. 
None of this suggests that an adequate theory of indirect co-perpetration cannot be 
constructed. However, it cannot be merely assumed, and that theory is certainly not a                                                         
45 See Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 60. 
46 Ibid,. para. 61. 
47 See Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 62 (concluding that modes of liability can be 
combined when the elements of each are established). For a comparative law perspective on combining 
modes of liability: Van Sliedregt 2012, supra note 10, at 68–69. 
48 Katanga and Chui Confirmation Decision, para. 493. 
49 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Trial Judgement, IT-97-24, T.Ch., 31 July 2003, para. 469. 
straightforward application of the bare text of the Statute. Constructing this theory requires a 
judicial recognition of how the control-theory has evolved in German criminal law doctrine and 
how far it should be extended, based on an independent examination of basic principles of 
criminal law Dogmatik. Some theory must explain this new mode of liability as it emerges from 
the raw materials of Article 25(3)(a). Through forming a common intent, both Katanga and 
Ngudjolo allegedly reached beyond their own troops. They built a team of two, a collective with 
power over both of their troops. This fact may justify a legal attribution of the acts of Lubanga’s 
troops to Ngudjolo, and vice versa.50 However, an adequate theory needs to carefully distinguish 
between individuals who control distinct organizations but deploy them towards a common cause 
and individuals who jointly exercise combined authority over a single vertical organization. The 
latter constitutes a junta-model of indirect co-perpetration via a single apparatus of power, while 
the former represents a joint perpetration through multiple vertical organizations.51 The judicial 
standards for each flavour of the doctrine might be different, given the different structure of the 
‘control’ in these cases. So far the ICC has not explored these differences to a satisfactory degree. 
 
3.2. The role for organizations under Article 25 
Van den Wyngaert also expressed anxiety about the growing importance of organizations within 
the control-theory. Simply put, she argued that article 25 applies to indirect control over persons 
committing international crimes, but not indirect control over organizations committing the 
crimes. 52 This is a complex point and one that the various Pre-Trial Chambers have shown 
insufficient dedication to addressing. Of course, all organizations, whether criminal or corporate, 
are composed of natural persons.53 Hence Article 25 is applied to the indirect control of persons 
even where control is exercised by means of an organization.  The question is whether it is 
appropriate for the doctrine to give a special position to ‘organizations’ as a legally significant 
mediator that stands between the defendant and the relevant physical perpetrators who commit                                                         
50  On this point, see the analysis by B. Burghardt and G. Werle, ‘Die mittelbare Mittaterschaft–
Fortentwicklung deutscher Strafrechtsdogmatik im Völkerstrafrecht?’, in R. Bloy (ed.), Gerechte Strafe 
und legitimes Strafrecht: Festschrift für Manfred Maiwald zum 75. Geburtstag (2010), 849–64;  
Weigend 2011, supra note 10,  at 110–11; S. Wirth, ‘Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment, 
(2012) 10 JICJ 971, at 980 et seq.  
51 See Burghardt and Werle, supra note 50, at 863–4 (distinguishing between ‘indirect co-perpetration’ 
per se and cases of ‘joint indirect perpetration’); Weigend 2011, supra note 10, at 111 (junta model involves 
‘one group of subordinates subject to control by a group of leaders working together’); Ohlin 2011, supra 
note 43, at 779. 
52 See Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 52 (‘elevating the concept of “control over an 
organization” to a constitutive element of criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) is misguided’). 
53 Ibid., para. 53. 
the actual crimes. 54 For Van den Wyngaert, apparently, the concept of the organization is a 
distraction that finds no support in the Statute; furthermore it necessarily involves situations 
where individual control over the street-level perpetrators is increasingly attenuated (through 
bureaucracy) rather than direct. This objection is debatable. Roxin’s theory in fact emphasized 
that bureaucratic control is, in its own way, ‘immediate’ because the organization carries out the 
orders of the leader as a matter of course.  
If the ICC Appeals Chamber wishes to continue using Organisationsherrschaft within the 
context of indirect co-perpetration, it ought to come up with a deeper theoretical argument that 
explains why indirect perpetration through an organization is consistent with the language of 
Article 25 and its reference to persons. One argument might be that the organization is nothing 
more than a convenient legal shorthand for the control exercised by the defendant over the street-
level perpetrators who performed the actus reus of the crime. Under this approach, 
Organisationsherrschaft would not be a separate mode of liability at all, and therefore its absence 
from the text of Article 25 would be irrelevant. Rather, it would be classified as one avenue 
towards reaching the Article 25 standard of indirect perpetration: under that view, the indirect 
perpetrator indeed commits the offence through another person, namely, the immediate actor. The 
organization provides the ‘through’ element; it connects the indirect perpetrator with the actor.  
Another trend that might support the role of organizations within Article 25 is the 
growing importance of organizations in other areas of the substantive doctrine of international 
criminal justice. For example, the requirement of an ‘organizational plan or policy’ in crimes 
against humanity is now an accepted element along with the requirement of a widespread or 
systematic attack.55 Although this element is controversial, and some would prefer to eliminate it, 
the recent cases at the ICC are built around it.56  For example, the indictments against the Kenyan 
suspects relied on the existence of two organizations—the Muthaura and what the ICC dubbed 
the ‘Network’—to fulfil both the organizational requirement for crimes against humanity and 
                                                        
54 Ibid. (‘there is a fundamental difference between the interaction among individuals, even within the 
context of an organisation, and the exercise of authority over an abstract entity such as an “organisation”. 
Moreover, by dehumanising the relationship between the indirect perpetrator and the physical 
perpetrator, the control over an organisation concept dilutes the level of personal influence that the 
indirect perpetrator must exercise over the person through whom he or she commits a crime.’). 
55 For different views on this requirement, see the symposium in (2010) 23 LJIL. 825–873. 
56  But see M. Cupido, ‘The Policy Underlying Crimes Against Humanity: Practical Reflections on a 
Theoretical Debate’, (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum, 275–309 (suggesting that the facts as applied in 
various cases show a greater similarity between the ICTY and ICC standards for crimes against humanity 
with regard to the plan or policy requirement). 
also the organizational requirement for an organized apparatus of power.57 A coherent judicial 
theory of ‘organizations’ within international criminal law would have to holistically address all 
of these issues with one theory of macro-criminality. 
 
3.3. Dolus Eventualis 
The final—and perhaps most important—objection to the ICC’s continued reliance on indirect 
co-perpetration involves the application of dolus eventualis to these cases. The term dolus 
eventualis is notorious for competing and often conflicting definitions; the term may very well 
obscure more than it illuminates. Scholars at the domestic and international levels have argued 
extensively over whether it includes a so-called ‘volitional’ component, i.e. an attitude by the 
defendant (either resignation, reconciliation, approval, or consent) regarding the future event. 
There is also a parallel debate about whether dolus eventualis is similar to—or greater than—its 
common law cousin, recklessness. However, all definitions agree that dolus eventualis involves 
liability for foreseeing the mere possibility of future events. 
One way of extending criminal liability to cases where the actor does not directly foresee 
the harmful result has been devised by the ICTY. Under the third variant of JCE (JCE III), a 
participant in a JCE is held responsible for any reasonably foreseeable act of any other participant 
done in furtherance of the joint enterprise. JCE III thus allows convictions—as a principal, no 
less—for crimes committed by co-venturers that fall outside the scope of the agreed-upon plan. 
The ICC has so far been reluctant to adopt JCE doctrine. By refusing to read JCE doctrine into 
Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute, the ICC developed a reputation for analytical rigor with 
regard to criminal law theory. Yet, at least part of the rationale for the ICC’s adoption of control-
theory, though never explicitly stated as such,58 may have been to reach similar results as would 
have been possible under JCE without explicitly adopting that much-maligned doctrine.  
Indirect co-perpetration, as applied by the ICC, may indeed not be that much different 
from JCE III and its Pinkerton-like vicarious liability.59 A structural similarity appears as soon as 
liability for dolus eventualis is imposed. To be sure, there is conflicting precedent in this area, 
and some ICC Chambers have concluded that dolus eventualis is not applicable to most crimes                                                         
57 See Muthaura et al. Confirmation Decision, para. 229; Ruto et al. Confirmation Decision, para. 186. 
58 The Trial Chamber in Stakić was more explicit about searching a new path away from JCE. 
59 Pinkerton liability allows vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators that fall outside the scope of 
the criminal plan. It was cited with approval in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, IT-94-
A, 15 July 1999, para. 224 n. 289 (hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgment), citing Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 
(1946). 
prosecuted before the court.60 But some Chambers have declared that dolus eventualis (or some 
version of it) is consistent with article 30; and when combined with indirect co-perpetration, the 
two produce a result that is very similar to the controversial JCE III.61 Specifically, indirect co-
perpetration allows the defendant to be convicted for the crimes committed by the virtual 
apparatus of power deployed by one of the defendant’s co-perpetrators. If dolus eventualis is 
added to the mix, a conviction is allowed even if the crimes committed by the organized 
apparatus of power were not part of the criminal endeavour agreed to by the horizontal co-
perpetrators. The only limiting principle, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga, is that 
the defendant must have been aware of the possibility that such crimes might be committed and 
must have reconciled himself to that possibility or consented to it. 62  Indeed, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber recognized that ‘if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is low, 
the suspect must have clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may 
result from his or her actions or omissions.’ 63 The result is substantially similar to JCE III 
because both the defendant and his co-perpetrator are prosecuted as principals even though their 
attitudes to the crime are quite different. The defendant did not desire the crimes but nonetheless 
realized that they might occur; his co-perpetrator, however, might have indirectly perpetrated the 
crimes with full-blown intent. Whatever the merits of this theory, one should not pretend that it 
departs significantly from the underlying premise of JCE III.64 Both involve liability for risk-
taking behaviour.65 
None of this is to suggest that dolus eventualis is not a legitimate mental state, used in 
many jurisdictions, to ground criminal culpability. It certainly is. Rather, the doctrinal question is 
whether it is consistent with the default mens rea standard expressed in Article 30 of the Statute, 
which states that the applicable mental state shall be intent and knowledge ‘unless otherwise 
provided’. Intent and knowledge require awareness that the consequence will occur ‘in the                                                         
60 See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the ICC 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05 -01/08, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, 15 June 2009, paras. 366–369 (rejecting application of dolus eventualis under the ICC 
Statute). 
61 For example, see the analysis in Lubanga Confirmation Decision paras. 352–353 (applying dolus 
eventualis).  
62 Ibid., para 352. There are, of course, different formulations of dolus eventualis in domestic legal 
systems; the notion of ‘reconciling’ oneself to the potential consequence is just one of them, though it is 
arguably the most influential. For a discussion of the different versions, see M. E. Badar, ‘Dolus Eventualis 
and the Rome Statute Without It?’, (2009) 12 New Crim. L Rev. (2009) 433. 
63 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, para. 354 (emphasis added). 
64 See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 43, 771 et seq. 
65 In Tadić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber explicitly referred to dolus eventualis as the basis for JCE III, 
where the defendant ‘willingly took the risk’. See Tadić Appeals Judgment, para. 220. 
ordinary course of events’. Most of the authoritative commentators writing about the ICC statute 
drafting process agree that dolus eventualis was not explicitly covered by the Article 30 standard. 
For example, Roger Clark famously wrote that ‘dolus eventualis and its common law cousin, 
recklessness, suffered banishment by consensus at Rome’.66 The key piece of evidence is the 
draft of the 1996 Preparatory Committee report, which included a subsection on dolus eventualis 
and recklessness that was subsequently deleted and never made it into the final version of the 
ICC Statute.67 
To reiterate the point, none of this demands a form of global scepticism regarding dolus 
eventualis. Rather, the point is simply that its application to situations of indirect co-perpetration 
is powerful, and the ICC must tread carefully to determine whether it is consistent with the 
principle of individual culpability. A defendant charged with being an indirect co-perpetrator is 
held responsible for actions perpetrated by a vertical organization that he does not personally 
direct. In cases of dolus eventualis, the crimes are not desired by the defendant but merely 
foreseen as a potential risk. What is this hypothetical defendant’s level of culpability? Surely 
such individuals are guilty of some offence under some mode of liability, but that is not the 
question here—the issue is whether they are deserving of Roxin’s label of Täter hinter dem 
Täter, the mastermind who stands behind the criminal operation. Given that indirect co-
perpetration is not explicitly listed in Article 25, the ICC ought to be certain that such a 
classification is warranted. As it stands now, none of the previous opinions of the court have yet 
accomplished this task. 
 
4. HIERARCHY OF BLAMEWORTHINESS? 
 
4.1. Normative approaches to criminal participation 
According to the proponents of control-theory, Article 25(3)(a) is an expression of what can be 
called a normative approach to criminal participation: the principal is the one who is ‘most                                                         
66 See R. Clark, ‘Elements of Crimes in Early Decisions of Pre-Trial Chambers of the International Criminal 
Court’, (2009) New Zealand YIL. Piragoff and Robinson conclude that while dolus eventualis can be 
defined in many ways, if it refers to ‘substantial or serious risk that a consequence will occur and 
indifference whether it does’ then it was ‘not incorporated explicitly into article 30’ and the only way to 
bring it into play is with the ‘unless otherwise provided’ prong of Article 30. D. K. Piragoff and D. 
Robinson, ‘Mental Element’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (2008), at 849, 860 n.67. Schabas’ analysis is similar. See W. A. Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010) at 476  (concluding that dolus 
eventualis was rejected during Rome Statute negotiations). 
67 Chairman’s Text, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/CRP.4. 
responsible’ in the sense that he or she has decisive influence on the commission of the crime, 
without necessarily physically committing it. This contrasts to what can be termed the naturalistic 
or empirical approach to liability, which takes as a starting point the natural world and the reality 
of cause and effect.68 In ‘empirical terms’, the perpetrator is the one who performs the material 
elements of the offence and thus ‘perpetrates’ or ‘commits’ the crime. The accessory or 
accomplice is the one who contributes to causing the actus reus. Anglo-American complicity law, 
based on a physical concept of ‘commission’, is the classic example of the empirical approach to 
criminal participation.   
The empirical system can be referred to as a bottom-up system. If it is applied to a 
complex structure of criminal cooperation, say an army, one starts with the soldier who killed a 
civilian, and then moves on to his superior who gave the orders, and then further on to the 
government minister who devised the relevant policy. The normative approach, on the other 
hand, represents a top-down system. One starts with the person who has the main responsibility, 
for example the minister, and then works one’s way down to the smaller fry in the lower echelons 
of the military unit. Thus, in the Anglo-American complicity scheme the government minister is 
an accessory, while on the basis of a normative system like the control-theory he is a principal.  
 The ICTY has adopted a normative approach with regard to JCE liability. The Appeals 
Chamber in Tadić referred to JCE, or common purpose as it was then referred to, ‘a form of 
accomplice liability’.69  But it also used the term ‘perpetrator’ and ‘co-perpetrator’ to refer to a 
‘participant’ in a JCE.70 Moreover, it brought JCE liability under the heading of ‘committing’ and 
distinguished it from aiding and abetting which, it felt, understates the degree of criminal 
responsibility.71 These findings sparked a debate amongst Trial Chambers in subsequent cases. 
There were judges who felt it important to adhere to the principal/committing- 
accomplice/participation distinction, 72  and there were others who thought that the principal-
accomplice classification is immaterial because it is at sentencing level that variance in roles is 
expressed.                                                          
68 On normative and naturalistic approaches to criminal participation in international law, see J. Vogel, 
‘How to determine individual criminal responsibility in systematic contexts: Twelve Models’ (2002) 
Cahiers de Défense Sociale, 151–169. 
69 Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 220. 
70  Ibid., para. 192.  
71  Ibid. 
72  The Krstić and Kvočka Trial Chambers, on the other hand, readily accepted the distinction between co-
perpetrators and aiders and abettors. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Judgment, Trial Chamber I, IT-98-33-T, 2 
August 2001, paras. 643–645; Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Judgment, Trial Chamber I, IT-98-30/1-T, 2 
November 2001, paras. 278 and 284. 
 Without going into details of the debate, 73  it suffices to conclude that with JCE a 
categorization of offenders along normative lines was introduced to ICTY case law. In the 
Odjanić Decision, the majority of the Appeals Chamber—over a strong dissent by Judge Hunt— 
affirmed that ‘joint criminal enterprise is to be regarded, not as a form of accomplice liability, but 
as a form of commission’.74  With the latter position, aiding and abetting developed into a mode 
of liability that is considered less blameworthy than participation in a JCE. This was confirmed in 
Šljivančanin, where the Appeals Chamber held that ‘aiding and abetting is a lower form of 
liability than ordering, committing, or participating in a joint criminal enterprise and may as such 
attract a lesser sentence’. 75  Research into international sentencing confirms that aiding and 
abetting has been treated, by the ad hoc Tribunals, as less blameworthy than other modes of 
liability.76 By now it is safe to assume that a mitigation principle applies at the ICTY with regard 
to aiding/abetting versus JCE-liability, which shows the influence of a normative approach to 
criminal participation.77  
 The same hierarchy of blameworthiness with regard to aiding/abetting vis-à-vis JCE can 
be found in SCSL law. The conviction of Charles Taylor is interesting in that respect. Taylor was 
convicted for aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 50 
years in prison.78 Had he been convicted for JCE, the sentence would have been higher.79 Still, 50 
years is a serious sentence in the overall SCSL sentencing practice. While aiding and abetting is 
considered a lesser form of liability, it does not automatically imply a lenient sentence; leniency 
is a relative concept.80 
                                                        
73  See further H. Olasolo, Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Superiors as Principals 
to International Crimes (2009), 23–27; C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal responsibility for Core 
International Crimes (2008), 198–212; E. van Sliedregt, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to 
Convicting Individuals for Genocide’ (2007) 5 JICJ 184. 
74  Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Pre-Trial Chamber, IT-05-87-PT, 22 March 2006, para. 20.  
75  Prosecutor v.  Šljivančanin, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, IT-95-13/1-A, 5 May 2009, para. 407. 
76  As empirical research has shown. B. Hola et al., ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures. Sentencing 
Practice at the ICTY and ICTR’ (2011) 9 JICJ411, at 417. 
77  See also Olasolo, supra note 73, at 27. 
78  Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Judgment, Trial Chamber, SCSL-03-1-T, 26 April 2012, para. 6959. 
79  Consider the statement of Judge Lussick, a member of the Taylor-bench, who held that the 80-year 
imprisonment requested by the prosecutor would have been excessive as Taylor was convicted of aiding 
and abetting which ‘as a mode of liability generally warrants a lesser sentence than that imposed for more 
direct forms of participation’. 
80 Rather, it affects, along with other factors, the sentence of the convicted person. Charles Taylor’s 
capacity as a former Head of State was an aggravating factor that seems to have ‘compensated’ the 
mitigation that aiding/abetting implies.  
 Preference for the normative model is even stronger at the ICC. The majority of the Court 
strictly adheres to the distinction—introduced by the control-theory—between principals and 
accessories and distinguishes between principal liability (‘committing’) in subparagraph 3(a) and 
accessorial liability (‘contributing to’) in subparagraphs (3)(b-d) using a normative approach.81 
Charging defendants as intellectual or remote principals under 25(3)(a) means that they played a 
central role, that they had ‘control of the crime’. 82  This is contrasted to liability under 
subparagraphs 25(3)(b-d) where control plays no role and accessories are regarded as less 
responsible and less blameworthy.  
 But even at the ICC the normative approach of the control-theory has been subject to 
dispute. Judge Tarfusser, in his dissent to the Appeals Decision in the Regulation 55 case in 
Katanga, referred to the Court’s case law on Article 25(3) as ‘far from … uncontentious or 
settled’;83  and Judges Fulford and Van den Wyngaert in their concurring opinions manifestly 
disagreed with the normative hierarchy that the control-theory (allegedly) creates in Article 25(3) 
of the ICC Statute. 
 From the viewpoint of comparative law, it is interesting to note that the majority opinions 
in Lubanga (PTC and TC), on the one hand, and the concurring opinions of Judges Fulford and 
van den Wyngaert, on the other hand, reflect a clash of legal cultures that, interestingly, cuts 
across the civil v. common law divide. The majority views stand for a ‘dogmatic’ concept of 
perpetratorship and accessorial liability, which expects the substantive law to reflect (or describe) 
subtle differences in the measure of responsibility and seeks to establish criteria that permit 
distinctions between forms of liability (and, consequently, degrees of blameworthiness). This 
approach is typical for the German/Hispanic tradition. The minority approach, by contrast, looks 
at the substantive criminal law more from the perspective of the legality principle: it is enough 
that the definitions of the general and special parts capture as comprehensively as possible all 
potential forms of reprehensible conduct. Differentiating between degrees of responsibility is not 
the purpose of offense descriptions or of rules of the general part, but is left for judicial 
sentencing. This reflects the French and the Anglo-American traditions. 
 Leaving these comparative law-considerations aside, in what follows we try to shed some                                                         
81 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, paras. 330–335; Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision, paras. 506–508. 
82 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision, para. 518. 
83 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain 
Katanga against the decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled ‘Decision on the 
implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the 
accused persons’, Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 13, 27 March 2013, para. 15. 
light on the reasons and implications of the dispute between the majority opinions and the Fulford 
and Van den Wyngaert opinions. 
  
4.2. Accessorial and derivative liability  
Problematic in the control-theory is the use of the term ‘accessorial’ and the normative meaning 
attached to it. Consider the Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision with regard to indirect 
co-perpetration v. ordering, 
 The leader’s ability to secure this automatic compliance with his orders is the basis for his 
principal—rather than accessorial—liability. The highest authority does not merely order the 
commission of a crime, but through his control over the organization, essentially decides whether 
and how the crime would be committed.84 
 ‘Accessorial liability’ is equated to ‘lesser liability’. This is confusing to the extent that it 
does not comport with the empirical model of criminal participation where ‘accessorial’, as non-
principal/accomplice liability, has no normative connotation. 85 It merely indicates that liability is 
‘derivative’, i.e. that liability depends on the principal crime. Indeed, the modes of liability in 
Article 25(3)(b–d), by requiring the crime to be at least attempted, and by criminalizing a 
contribution to a crime, constitute forms of derivative liability. They differ from principal liability 
in subparagraph 25(3)(a) where ‘commission’ of a crime is defined. Clearly Judge Van den 
Wyngaert reasoned from an empirical approach to criminal participation when she argued that the 
principal-accessory distinction in Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute is merely ‘conceptual’ and that 
it should not translate to a ‘different legal treatment’.86 We agree with that position to the extent 
that the terminology in Article 25(3) (b–d) cannot in itself be taken as a normative indication of 
lesser blameworthiness. Support for this position can be taken from comparative criminal law; 
there is no rule or theory that categorically links accessorial/non-principal liability to lesser 
                                                        
84 Para. 518, emphasis added. 
85 Originally, in felony law there was a normative distinction between principals in the first degree (the 
perpetrator/principal), principals in the second degree (secondary principal), and accessories before the 
fact. The difference between secondary principals and an accessory before the fact, both of whom are 
accomplices, was that the secondary principal was at the scene of the crime while the accessory was not. 
The secondary principal was generally more closely involved in committing the crime than the accessory, 
while the crime was physically committed by the principal in the first degree. J. Dressler, ‘Reassessing the 
Theoretical Underpinning of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem’, (1985) 37 Hastings 
LJ  191, at 194–95. See Van Sliedregt 2012, supra note 10, 112–116. 
86 Para 22. 
responsibility.87  
 Having said that, aiding and abetting in subparagraph (3)(c) can be regarded as less 
blameworthy vis-à-vis joint perpetration in subparagraph (3)(a). Where accomplices such as 
aiders and abettors are further removed from the centre of the commission of the offence, their 
responsibility is reduced in comparison to perpetrators, and consequently their punishment should 
be reduced as well. This interpretation of aiding and abetting comports with the previously 
mentioned normative approach to aiding and abetting in international jurisprudence.  
 In our view, the hierarchical distinction among four types of perpetrators and 
accomplices, as proposed by the Lubanga Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber and the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Katanga and Ngudjolo, does not adequately reflect the normative relationship 
between these types of participants. Ordering, soliciting and inducing others to commit crimes in 
subparagraph 3(b) is not necessarily less blameworthy than indirectly perpetrating a crime as 
penalized in subparagraph (3)(a). Even Kai Ambos, a staunch supporter of the control-theory and 
its (alleged) hierarchical structure88, admits that the hierarchy in Article 25(3) is ‘less evident 
with regard to subparagraph (b) – especially with regard to ‘ordering’ which belongs structurally 
and systematically to subparagraph (a)’.89    
 Moreover, it is highly questionable whether Article 25(3) is based on a single coherent, 
normative theory of participation. Nothing in the drafting history of the ICC suggests that Article 
25(3) was to constitute a self-contained system of criminal participation with a coherent doctrinal 
grounding. To the contrary, as the chairman of the Working Group on General Principles recalls, 
drafting Article 25(3) posed great difficulties to negotiate; eventually, a near-consensus was 
reached where there would be one provision to cover the responsibility of principals and all other 
modes of participation. Article 25(3) was to provide the court with a range of modalities from 
which to choose.90  
                                                        
87 Even in those systems that provide for a distinction between principals and accessories where labelling 
comes with a sentence reduction, ‘principal liability’ may still be derivative/accessorial. For instance, co-
perpetrators in Dutch law have the status of accessories. Their liability rests on that of the physical 
perpetrator; they are only liable when the crime is committed or attempted. They are punished as if they 
were principals (Art. 47(1) Dutch Penal Code: ‘Als daders van een strafbaar feit worden gestraft: 1zij die 
het feit plegen, doen plegen of medeplegen’). 
88 K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law. Vol. I Foundations and General Part, (2013), 146–
47. 
89 Ambos, 2013, supra note 88, at 152–53. 
90 As discussed in P. Saland, ‘International criminal law principles’ in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International 
Criminal Court. The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999), at 198. 
 Bearing in mind this ‘aggregate’ background of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute, it seems 
that Article 25(3) reflects normative and empirical elements without clearly distinguishing 
between the two. The fact that article 25(3)(a) provides for instances of intellectual perpetration 
does not make it the sole theoretical grounding for the whole of Article 25. Nor does it relegate 
all participants covered by subparagraphs (b–d) to lesser liability. The ICC, in forging its path to 
identifying the responsibility of principals versus accessories, has been too rigorous in drawing 
lines according to the vague legislative concepts embodied in Article 25 (3) of the ICC Statute. 
  
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The fact that international courts adhere to a principal v. accomplice classification is noteworthy, 
particularly since this labelling in international law does not result in a mandatory mitigation or 
increase of sentences.91 The reason why the distinction is cultivated may well be a desire to 
extend the status of principal in international criminal law.92  Despite the noted lack of practical 
value, stigmatization through attributing the status of principal is important because of the 
expressive value and the denunciatory and educational function of conferring this status in 
international criminal law.93 Making clear who masterminded crimes by referring to him/her as 
‘principal’ who ‘commits’ crimes is important in communicating to victims and the international 
                                                        
91  According to Arts. 77 and 78 of the ICC Statute the Court can impose any sentence (up to lifelong 
imprisonment) taking into account the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person; no distinction is made between forms of responsibility. This does not mean that in 
sentencing role-variance does not play a role. Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
ICC stipulates that judges in their determination of sentence give consideration to the ‘degree of 
participation of the convicted person’. This accords with practice at the ICTY where the Appeals Chamber 
held that ‘the gravity of the offence’ as stipulated in Art. 24(2), requires judges to consider the crime for 
which the accused has been convicted, the underlying criminal conduct in general, and the role of the 
offender in the commission of the crime (ergo the degree of participation). Still, it is at the level of 
sentencing, not at conviction level, that the degree of responsibility is expressed. 
92 Consider in this respect F. Z. Giustianini’s paper on the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber’s ruling in Seromba 
where a broad concept of ‘commission’ was adopted and where instigation would have been more 
appropriate. According to F. Z. Giustanini this was to impose a severe and exemplary punishment on 
Seromba. F. Z. Giustanini, ‘Stretching the Boundaries of Commission Liability. The ICTR Appeals 
Judgment in Seromba’, (2008) 6 JICJ 783, at 798. See also G. Townsend, ‘Current Developments in the 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, (2005) 5 ICLR 147, at 156.  
93 See M. A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007), 174. In sentencing practice, 
this translates to attaching much weight to the sentencing purposes of retribution and deterrence. E.g. 
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Judgment, Appeals Chamber, IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001, para. 806; 
Prosecutor v. Serushago, Sentence, Trial Chamber, ICTR 98-39-S, 5 February 1999, para 20; Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, Judgement In Sentencing Appeals, Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis, 26 January 
2000, para. 48. See R. Henham, ‘Some issues for sentencing in the International Criminal Court’, (2003) 
52 ICLQ 81. Note also § 5 of the preamble of the ICC Statute, which comprises the aim to contribute to the 
prevention of international crimes. 
community as a whole who was the ‘real’ culprit.94 Bearing this purpose in mind, there is value 
in adopting a normative approach to conferring the status of ‘principal’ (rather than accomplice) 
to persons who are the main concern of international criminal law: the remote or intellectual 
perpetrators who use others to commit crimes.   
 Yet the control-theory as developed by the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers and Trial 
Chamber in the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo cases suffers from ambiguities and 
wrongful assumptions. So far, the control-theory does not provide the limitation of liability 
that some expected it to bring. In current ICC jurisprudence, co-perpetration and indirect co-
perpetration are broad liability theories, suffering from unclear underlying tenets and a one-
dimensional use of the concept of ‘control’. Moreover, the alleged normative hierarchy of 
blameworthiness rests on a confusing interpretation of ‘accessorial’ and takes the normative 
interpretation of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute too far. The authors hope the ICC Appeals 
Chamber takes this unique opportunity to reconsider or improve the control-theory as 
developed by the Pre-Trial Chambers in the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo cases. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
94 See C. Kress, ‘Claus Roxins Lehre von der Organisationsherrschaft und das Völkerstrafrecht’, (2006) 153 
Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht 304, at 308; Weigend 2011, supra note 10, at 102–103. 
